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Cultural Changes and the
Crisis of Politics in
Post-Modern Society
Franco Crespi

In this article I intend to examine some aspects of the cultural
changes taking place in post-modern society. Assuming a certain
knowledge of the considerable amount of literature on the subject,
I will try first to outline briefly the main aspects of the cultural
changes which help to shed light on the meaning of the present
crisis of politics. I will then develop some arguments on the possible new developments of the role of politics in our era.
The contemporary cultural situation can be analyzed according to three main levels. The first level can be described as theoretic
and is apparent in the crisis of the great totalizing ideologies.
This crisis is linked, as is well known, to:
a) the progressive recognition of the limits of knowledgerelated to the development of epistemology of science in its relationship with empirical experience;
b) the end, as a result, of thorough investigation of the
nature of cognitive experience, of metaphysical forms;
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c) the disappearance of telos,or in other words, the end of
the great naturalistic-evolutionist
visions and the global
interpretation of history;
d) the emergence of the irreconcilable character of both the
existential and the social situation, as a consequence of the
previous three aspects.
In the absence of a complete and thorough explanation of existence, due to the impossibility of taking absolute fundaments or
final conclusions as reference, the question of the meaning of existence is left open and a basic contradiction is revealed between
man's infinite desire and the finite limits of the meaning of real
experience. God's death marks, in the final analysis, the end also
of the great secular movements founded on a mystic concept of
humanity, seen as a unitary organism in constant evolution (cf.
Crespi 1985a).
The failure of these perspectives influences in particular the
progressive shift from concepts directed towards a radical renewal of the forms of social life (of a revolutionary-utopistic form) to
more limited concepts of reform. This is not intended obviously
as an assertion that in our world there no longer exist active ideological forces of a totalizing nature, but that these forces appear to
be in contrast with the main trends of philosophical and scientific
experience of post-modernity: in this context the totalizing tendencies prove to be regressive expressions, increasingly linked to
social situations characterized by anomie and emargination.
The secondlevel is psychosocialand appears to be directly connected to the experience of subjective existence in the new social
conditions. This is usually expressed in terms of both individual
and collective identity crisis. The phenomenon of differentiation
and fragmentation of social life which characterizes the societies
of late capitalism leads to a plurality of social formations different
from the traditional ones (family, class, employment, politics,
etc.), so that social groups and individuals are faced with a
"growing pluralization of role involvement" (Parsons 1968: 11)
and the fact that their identity is no longer "the content of a tradition" (Habermas 1976: 87). The implications of the identity crisis
which have affected strata, categories, social groups and even
entire national communities (in countries where the process of
modernization is fairly recent) are evident, paradoxically, only in
the accentuation of the difference between society and the individual and in the increase of the value attributed to creativity,
imagination, individual needs, privacy, etc., which characterizes
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contemporary culture. The claim to an identity and the search for
identification-through
participation in the various social movements, associations, and groups based on race, sex, age, politics,
religion, various cultural and recreative activities, and sometimes
even on drugs or violence-is in many respects a new element.
This is so not only in the forms which identity has assumed, but
above all because it expresses in a directway the very need for an
identity . The priorities of various feminist, homosexual and
youth movements today are of an ontologicalnature insofar as
what is sought more than anything else is a right to an identity,
while the pursuit of common interestscomes only in second place
(cf. Melucci 1982). The reasons for this phenomenon can be primarily linked to the instability which characterizes positions and
roles in post-industrial societies which are undergoing continuous, rapid changes : societies in which identities, instead of being
grantedaccording to birth, objective class membership and territorial bonds, are increasingly the result of choicesmade at various
stages during a lifetime, through continuous processes of socialization and renegotiation of relationships (cf. Berger 1974: 207;
Bell 1976; Sciolla 1983; Gallino 1982: 69 ss.).
It is in this context that the particular relationship which
exists between identity and the dimension of power becomes evident both on an individual level-as a problem of interdependence between personal identity and inner power-and
on a
social level, as the problem of the circular relationship between
power as producer (or denier) of identity and identity as a form of
legitimation (or delegitimation) of power, including, naturally, the
internal connections between these two levels (cf. Robertson &
Holzner 1980; Crespi 1983). To examine the problem of identity
mainly in terms of interiorization by the individual of the dominant values and models of the social system, as Parsons did in
1968, seems today to be altogether inadequate if we take into
account the fact that the present situation is characterized by the
plurality of values and models in such a system, by an "excess of
alternatives" which , in the absence of a strong ego, gives rise to a
growing "indeterminateness
of the collective culture" (Rositi
1981, 1983). Thus , it appears that in this situation reinforcement
of identity must not be considered, in the traditional sense, as a
reinforcement of identifications and social solidarity but, in a
more problematical way, as the question of how to increase the
inner power of the individual, or in other words, in the ego's
capacity to maintain a relative distance from the various distinct
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forms of identity that he/she has to assume according to the different levels and phases of his/her social life. One must therefore
acknowledge that a certain conception of identity as a stable and
permanent form, established once and for all, has entered a state
of crisis (cf. Levi-Strauss 1977). This is instead replaced by a more
complex consideration of the inner dynamics which the ego, in its
relative indefiniteness, maintains with the established forms of
symbolic mediation which ensure each time the objective forms of
identity necessary for social interaction (cf. Crespi 1985b). The
construction of a personal identity appears today, therefore, primarily as an ability to negotiate social identities internally, or, in
other words, as a process of exploration of various possibilities,
and different practical solutions (cf. Turner 1968: 1075; Goffman
1961; Luhman 1979; Berger, Berger & Kellner 1973: 62 ss.).
The third level of analysis of the present socio-cultural situation is of a more specific sociologicalcharacter and concerns directly the process of the increasing differentiation of the spheres of
social life and the consequent fragmentation of the social system
into various specialized sub-systems (cf. Luhman 1975). This situation has been interpreted by Habermas (1981a, b) in terms of the
growing divergence between social system and life-world
(Lebenswelt).
With reference to Max Weber's critique of the concept of
rationalization, Habermas emphasizes the fact that the objectivetechnical processes of modernization connected with the develop ment of capitalism tend to reduce the possibilities for human
experience offered by the rationalization of world views and
social forms. The assumption central to Habermas' analysis is
that the process of cultural rationalization which took place during the history of humanity can be depicted as a rational development of world views and of codified cognitive structures, linked
to the concrete transformations of means of production and forms
of social organization. According to Habermas, the historical process leading to capitalism has produced an increasing divergence
between the reductional principles of functional-instrumental reason which characterizes the structural logic of advanced industrial societies including the possibilities offered by the substantial
rationalization processes, and the development of communicative
socialization present in these same societies at the everyday-lifeworld-level. Life-world represents for Habermas the widespread
horizon within which are preserved and transmitted the interpretations of preceding generations, the forms of symbolic mediation
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by means of which traditional cultures are maintained and reproduced, social integration is strengthened, and personal identities
are confirmed (cf. Habermas 1981b, II: 182 ss.). Since, however,
social action develops not only in the symbolic space of the lifeworld but also in that of the functional organization of social systems, as "systemically stabilized action-contexts of socially
integrated groups" (II: 228), it is also necessary to analyze the
dynamic relationship between life-world and functional systems
as dimensions not reducible to one another.
As is well known, functionalist systems are characterized in
Parsons' theory as self-regulating action-contexts which coordinate actions around specific mechanisms or "media," such as
money or power. However, the functionalist model, in Habermas'
view, does not take sufficiently into account the distinctive characteristics of the life-world, where processes of communicative
action follow a logic which cannot be reduced to that of functional
mechanisms (money /power) and cannot be replaced by the latter
without serious pathological consequences. While the concepts of
system and life-world were originally co-extensive, subsequently
social evolution has produced an ever-increasing differentiation
of these two dimensions: the social system has developed according to principles of functional and instrumental rationality
through a growing distinction between power structures and kinship structures (formation of the state apparatus as different from
that of the clan structures) and an increasingly autonomous market economy in respect to the local spheres of life. This process of
differentiation ended up reducing the life-world to the status of
one sub-system among others (cf. ibid., II: 229 ss.). Since social
systems remain nonetheless linked by specific institutional complexes to the life-world, the differentiation between the two levels
creates serious contradictions and imbalance. While rationalization of the social level has developed, on the one hand, in increasing degrees of organizational, economic, administrative and
political complexity, rationalization of life-world has been characterized, on the other hand, by the separation among different
spheres of value and by the logical advancement of levels of
learning . As a matter of fact, the evolution which has affected
life-world is characterized, according to Habermas, by the progressive distinction between subjective and social world, furthering the transition from an egocentric, absolutist understanding of
the world to a decentralized and relativized understanding of it
(Habermas 1981a, I: 105-6).
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The dynamic relationship established between the processes
of rationalization at the social-system level (as an increase of its
complexity based on functional values of production and control)
and the process of rationalization at the life-world level (as a
development of creative and critical ability) can be analyzed in
terms of its circularity: rationalization of the life-world is a condition of the increase in complexity of the system, but this in turn
influences the life-world, reducing its potentialities ("inner-colonization of the life-world," in ibid., II: 517 ss.).
Reductionist mediation of the life-world through system
imperatives causes pathological effects
insofar as critical disequilibria in material reproduction [ ... ] can
be avoided only at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the life-world (i.e., of subjectively experienced, identitythreatening crises or pathologies). (Ibid., II: 452 ss.)

In point of fact, when the mechanisms of monetarization and bureaucratization of the economic and administrative spheres exceed
their role and penetrate the spheres pertaining to the life-world of
cultural transmission, socialization and personal identity, the freedom of the processes of communicative action are seriously compromised.
On the basis of the analysis of interaction processes between
life-world and communicative action on the one hand, and social
system and instrumental action on the other, Habermas maintains
that the evils of the societies of late capitalism can be identified
with the tendency of systematic mechanisms to intrude into the
life-world and with the tendency of functional models to replace
the forms that characterize communicative rationality. Taking
Marx's analysis as a reference, Habermas explains this tendency
as a product of the inner logic of the processes of accumulation
and valorization of capital. In advanced capitalist societies , with
the development of the Welfare State and state economic intervention, control of the contradictions present on an economic level
and in class conflict can be maintained by displacing the tensions
into other spheres of social life, where the conflict appe ars in
forms which cannot be linked directly to class structures. In this
way new conflicting forms and new movements appear which
reveal, in Habermas' view, the contrast between the all-inclusive
tendencies of the social system and the possibilities for autonomy
and self-reflection which have opened up today in communicative action by virtue of logical development (cf. ibid.: 489 ss.).
Habermas ' concept of life-world as the ideal base for com-
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municative action gives rise to numerous questions. In the dualism between life-world and the social system, Ferdinand Tennies'
society-community dichotomy seems to reappear in a renewed
version: in Habermas' analysis the life-world, as a place of communicative action , is shown as the domain which establishes substantial rationality, while the functional rationality of systemic
structures is seen as the principal source of social tensions and
alienations. This distinction can be useful in showing how, on a
global societal level, the determinate forms of mediation, in order
to control collective action, must necessarily have a greater degree
of generality and absoluteness: they are therefore more abstract
and less flexible with regard to the more differentiated and open
forms of mediation connected with the experience of the lifeworld. The contrast between the two levels in terms of the disparate quality of their relative principles of rationality appears,
however, in Habermas' analysis once again to be dictated mainly
by the needs of an absolute foundation of value rather than by
empirical experience. While acknowledging the interdependence
between life-world and the social system, the logic of power and
money tends to be attributed exclusively to the social system
structure, without equal recognition of its connections with the
forces at work in the life-world: the idea of colonization by the
social system of the latter does not give, in its unidirectionality,
adequate relevance to the dimensions of life-world which contribute to the development of the social system. To say that the
tensions of present society are the product of the displacement
into the life-world of the tensions and conflicts of the systemic
structure-linked
to the logic of the development of mature capitalism in its economic and political aspects - seems to be an over ly simplistic interpretation (cf. Thompson 1983: 292 ss.), which
runs the risk of idealizing the life-world.
This does not alter the fact, however, that the present tendency towards a progressive differ entiation between the interaction
processes of everyday life and the increasingly complex organizational level of the social system as such is an actual characteristic
to be taken into account in an analysis of the crisis of politics,
together with the other aspects mentioned above.
Another aspect I feel should be examined in order to understand the specific meaning of the current crisis of politics in contemporary developed societies is the particular attitude towards
the norms which seems to prevail in that kind of society. Much of
the sociological res earch carried out in Italy in these last years on
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youth movements and identity (see, for example, Garelli, Melucci,
Sciolla, et al.) have emphasized, as I mentioned before, not only
the fragmentation of social orders and the multiple and provisional nature of identity statuses, but above all what has been called
the "expansion of possibilities" or "excess of opportunities"
offered by contemporary
developed societies. It could be
inferred, therefore, that the relationship with the norms tends
today, in a situation of relativization of symbolic orders, to be
expressed according to a greater freedom of choice. It is in this
perspective that the accent has been put on post-materialist values (Inglehart), on the increase in critical reflection, on the shift
from needs of an acquisitive nature to those of self-realization
(Altan, Sciolla, Ricolfi, Melucci), and on the accentuation of individual rather than collective logic (Garelli), etc.
On the other hand it is also true that, even apart from the
episodes connected with terrorism, the considerable success of
certain religious movements would seem to indicate a desire to
return to absolute forms and certainties capable of reducing the
complexity created by the excess of possibilities. How are we to
interpret this phenomenon, which appears to swing between the
opposing tendencies, on the one hand, of a lack of commitment
and increase in critical reflexivity and, on the other hand, of
involvement and fanaticism?
Bearing in mind the various types of behavior which can be
expressed, on the basis of an analysis of the action-norms relationship, in terms of agreement or disagreement between the internal
values of orientation and socially codified values, it can be sur mised that we find ourselves faced today with a real possibility of
radical transformation of the attitude towards the norms, along
the lines of what could be described as a pragmatism basedon the
recognitionof conventionalityof norms as such (a possibility which I
have examined elsewhere in terms of an increase in the inner
power of the subjects). However, a similar possibility seems
today to be far from being realized.
Apart from marginal cases which obviously cannot be
ignored, what we are faced with today is neither a situation of
widespread anomie-since the accentuation of the individualistic
dimension seems, all things considered, to allow the individual
(perhaps due to a reinforcement of the inner power of the ego) to
move with relative ease among institutional norms-nor an ideal
situation characterized by an effective increase in the ability to
make choices and projects on the basis of new forms of social soli-
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darity and a new awareness of the kind of cultural-social transformations taking place. Thus the more diffused contemporary type
of political behavior seems to be characterized by discordance
between subjective and social values in the presence of relatively
flexible social structures, within which no apparent actions
emerge to contest the social system as such: a form of behavior
determined primarily on the basis of specific interests (whether
individual or group) and which tends to make the best use, in an
unscrupulous and instrumental way, of opportunities as they
arise . A kind of behavior which I would define as instrumentalopportunisticwithout implying by this any moral judgment: it is
simply a question of interpreting a pattern of behavior which can
in no way be judged either positively or negatively, but which
must be assessed in its specificity. The relative weakening of the
totalizing character of the normative-symbolic representations,
linked to a situation of progressive differentiation of the social
structure, seems to bring about an accentuation of the ability, present to some extent in every kind of society, to go throughthe institutional orders in the pursuit of particular aims, without
necessarily altering the orders themselves.
Such a hypothesis could facilitate an understanding of the
characteristics of many religious and ecological movements
which, despite the potential tendency in some of them towards
new fideistic forms which arouse fanaticism, never lose sight of
practical strategic objectives. In this context, instead of referring
to a simple estrangement from politics, the question should be
asked whether we are faced with new pragmatic procedures in
politics, directly linked to new social and individual realities.
The political function tends to exist increasingly as a pragmatic action tied to specific interests, rather than as an action
characterized to a significant degree by ideological choices and
capable of producing general consensus. The political institutions, having lost all their sacred characters, are now revealed as
forms of normative-symbolic mediation in which the degree of
reduction of the complex needs of individual and collective experience inevitably appears very high. On the political level, any
determination of meaning must be simplified according to the
concrete forms of "average" feasibility, which are always excessively limited as regards the differentiated demands expressed at
other levels and in other forms of mediation (life-world level), relatively autonomous as regards politics even if they remain interrelated to it.
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In this situation, politics appears to have lost to a great extent
its capacity to grant an identity to individuals and groups, and
consequently also the possibility of existing as a privileged
instance of social belonging and solidarity. In recognizing the
plurality of the various dimensions at work in the social system,
politics would take its place, therefore, alongside other spheres of
sense, foregoing its existence as a privileged form of social integration. The problem appears to lie in ensuring that the recognition of the pluralism of the spheres of sense does not lead to the
disintegration of the social order and the accentuation of the corporative dimensions of political action. The risk is that politics'
loss of charisma, limiting its potential as a decisive unifying
moment, would lead to a levelling of society as a result of the
dominance of the normative dimension over that of projection. A
progressive disintegration of social unity through the intensification of sectorial conflict could ensue. In these conditions political
power, instead of being a function of general management of the
fundamental contradictions of society, with a long-term capacity
for projection and decision-making, takes on the simple function
of maintenance of the status quo, into an administrative role, by
means of compromises between the different social forces and
patronage concessions.
Given present conditions, it does not seem desirable that
political power, apart from its role as moderator of conflict and
guarantor of normative order, should try to regain its capacity to
interpret the evolutionary processes at work in social reality and
to promote the latter's potentialities, through a return to charismatic leadership, as some sociologists seem to think (cf. Cavalli
1981). Nor does it seem possible that politics could today be considered as a totalizing moment, unless as a result of a profound
regression, due to the state of uncertainty caused by the same crisis of identity and of unifying ideologies. It would appear thus
that an effort should be made to rethink, on the basis of an adequate interpretation of the above-mentioned socio-cultural char acteristics, the role of politics in order to promote a renewed
capacity of society for self-definition and expression. The result
of this should be pursued by an increase on a collective level in
the degree of understanding of the evolutionary significance of
the processes of social differentiation and cultural relativization at
work today, and through an increase in collective power as such,
if by power we mean the capacity to direct-pragmatically
and
without illusory, ideological deformations - the contradictions
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which inevitabl y arise in every social system.
In this perspective, politics would find a new specificity
no longer as an ideologically based form which ascribes identity and produces consensus, but as a place of practical communications among different social forces and as a particular
medium by which a community formulates projects on the
basis of shared interpretations and concrete choices, taking into
account its own real needs.
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